

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Homeland Defense: What is the Air National Guard's Role?**

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Homeland Security has risen in prominence in the last year as one of the paramount issues facing our nation today. Since September 11, 2001, the national focus has centered on the importance of protecting our citizens and other national interests both at home and abroad. President Bush responded to the threat of terrorism directed at U.S. interests by outlining his vision on our nation's homeland defense in his September 2002 National Security Strategy. Of the many questions to be resolved is the question of how the United States will employ its military forces in support of a homeland defense strategy, and specifically what will be the role of each service component? The answers to these questions are still not clear. This paper examines the role that the Air National Guard (ANG) will play in homeland defense by examining what the ANG's role was prior to September 11<sup>th</sup>, since September 11<sup>th</sup>, and then proposes a plan to integrate the ANG into the homeland defense strategy.



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## **HOMELAND DEFENSE: WHAT IS THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD'S ROLE?**

Homeland security has risen in prominence in the last year as one of the paramount issues facing our nation today. Since September 11, 2001, the national focus has centered on the importance of protecting our citizens and other national interests both at home and abroad. President Bush responded to the threat of terrorism directed at U.S. interests by outlining his vision on our nation's homeland defense in his September 2002 National Security Strategy. Of the many questions to be resolved is the question of how the U.S. will employ its military forces in support of a homeland defense strategy, and specifically what will be the role of each service component? The answers to these questions are still not clear. This paper examines the role that the Air National Guard (ANG) will play in homeland defense, by examining what the ANG's roles and responsibilities were prior to September 11th, the roles since September 11th, and the role as outlined in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, and the role of the Department of Homeland Security. This paper concludes with recommendations on the future role of the ANG.

According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, homeland security is defined as a concerted National effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur.<sup>1</sup> Homeland defense is defined as resisting attack or protecting one's native land.<sup>2</sup> According to agreement among experts in security and defense of our homeland, the term "defense" relates to the response to a criminal act and security relates to the management and security against a terrorist attack.<sup>3</sup> The word "defense" adds a "police" flavor to the definition.

## **HOMELAND DEFENSE: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD (ANG) PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup>**

The ANG was established in April 1946, prior to the establishment of a separate Air Force. Some believe the Air Guard was an expression of the drive for an independent Air Force.<sup>4</sup> The idea of enlarging and enhancing the National Guard system after WWII is reflected in the determination of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer, a retired Army General whom Marshall recalled to active duty in November 1941. According to Palmer, Marshall asked him to help develop a post war military system that would be consistent with our traditions, and one which might therefore expect favorable consideration by the American people and Congress.<sup>5</sup> Marshall learned from American history that the American people would not tolerate a large standing army after WWII. He also realized that if America wanted to avert the effects of a third war, she could no longer afford to virtually

disarm in peacetime. The war department plans called for an Air Guard, which would be highly trained and capable of augmenting an independent Air Force. It would consist of 58,000 men in 514 units. The units would consist of twelve Wing Headquarters, seventy-two fighter squadrons, and twelve bomber squadrons.<sup>6</sup> In order to facilitate the recruiting effort many of the units would be located near major metropolitan areas. Like the Army National Guard, which preceded it, the ANG would perform a dual function as an instrument of internal security for individual states in peacetime and an instrument of national security in war. The Adjutant General as directed by the State Governor had direct authority of the ANG units in his State unless the President federalized them.<sup>7</sup>

Since 1946 the ANG has been mobilized a total of seven times. Although the procedures for activation have not changed over the years, roles, responsibilities, public expectations, and performance has varied.

The chart below outlines the history of ANG call-ups.<sup>8</sup>

Year	Mission	Number of ANG troops
1950	Korean War	45,000
1961	National Emergency (Soviet build Berlin Wall)	21,067
1968	Vietnam	24,676
1991	Desert Storm	12,404
1996	Peacekeeping (Bosnia)	200
1999	Operation Allied Force (Kosovo)	4,000
2001	Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle	25,000 <sup>9</sup>

FIGURE 1: AIR NATIONAL GUARD ACTIVATIONS

The Korean War call-up uncovered weaknesses in the ANG program including confusion on specific wartime missions, equipment shortfalls, and lack of combat readiness. Eventually, the problems were worked out, but not before the mobilization caused a huge political uproar.<sup>10</sup>

During the second Air Guard mobilization in response to the Soviet Union's construction of the Berlin Wall fighter and reconnaissance squadrons were the bulk of the ANG assets mobilized. The units were in desperate need of additional personnel, spare parts, and training

before they were ready to go. The Air Force concluded that the Air Guard units deployed achieved little militarily and, as a matter of policy, decided the ANG needed to be better prepared for rapid global deployments.<sup>11</sup>

During the Vietnam call-up the ANG sent fighter, reconnaissance, and medical squadrons and performed much more effectively than in 1961. They did have some problems with equipment shortages but quickly overcame these problems and demonstrated how well they could perform if properly trained and equipped. Following the Vietnam War the ANG began receiving modern equipment, generous funding, and better training.<sup>12</sup>

The Desert Storm call-up demonstrated for the first time in history that the majority of the ANG called to active duty were from support organizations and not combat flying units. ANG units had little problem deploying and were quickly integrated into military operations.

A very small number of ANG members were activated during peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia. Air traffic control and combat communications units were needed during this effort and they performed well.

During Operation Allied Force the ANG activated and deployed 4,000 citizen soldiers. The overall readiness of the guard and reserves was described as "superb".<sup>13</sup> They were well-trained, disciplined, and creative when facing the many challenges during this operation.

Finally, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) have been the largest activation of the ANG since the Korean War. The ANG supports 75 percent of all ONE combat air patrols.<sup>14</sup> ANG tankers contribute 60 percent of ONE refueling taskings and 47 percent of the OEF requirement. Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, the average number of active duty days per traditional ANG member has increased from 39 to 51 days.<sup>15</sup>

Since 1990 ANG contributions to sustained total force operations have increased from 24 percent to 34 percent of the total force aircraft employed. Contingency support has also increased from 8 percent in 1993 to 22 percent in 2002. It appears the ANG is no longer a "force in reserve" but an integrated part of the total force.<sup>16</sup>

## **HOMELAND DEFENSE: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ANG AFTER SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup>**

From Desert Storm to just prior to September 11<sup>th</sup> the ANG significantly increased its role in the total force and also proved to be as capable and combat ready as its active duty counterpart. At the same time the ANG continued to provide trained personnel to support state and local authorities in time of natural disasters or civil strife at the command of the Governor. Title 10 (federalization) vs. title 32 (state authority) status of guardsmen has presented some

challenges for how the ANG has responded to homeland defense and how it will respond in the future. Since September 11<sup>th</sup>, nearly 7,200 Air and Army National Guardsmen have been activated to serve at 440 airports in the U.S. and an additional 1,615 Guardsmen to help with border security.<sup>17</sup> The challenge lies in the compliance with the 1878 law, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), that bars federalized troops from being armed in the U.S., making domestic arrests, and conducting searches and seizures. In order to respond quickly to vital national security issues the Pentagon skirted around the Act by allowing Guardsmen to be activated under title 32 and the states were re-imbursed by the federal government.

## **POSSE COMITATUS ACT**

The PCA is a product of post-reconstruction era politics that was enacted to correct perceived abuses of federal troops while on duty following the Civil War. Although the PCA prohibits federal troops from enforcing civilian law there is no constitutional prohibition and there are numerous exceptions to the act. The PCA does not apply to National Guard soldiers in their state active duty or title 32 status. It also does not apply in cases of weapons of mass destruction attacks on the U.S. when authorized by the SECDEF or SECSTATE or in cases of insurrection or civil disturbance when requested by the governor and authorized by presidential order.

The act causes confusion among the American people and military commanders and forces the adoption of the above mentioned exceptions in order to avoid its effect. Proponents of the PCA claim the deep seated aversion Americans feel towards the domestic use of military forces justifies the PCA. Yet since 1878 there have been no prosecutions brought under the PCA.<sup>18</sup>

Since September 11th the application of the PCA has had serious negative impacts on domestic military operations. When nearly 7,200 national guardsmen were activated to serve at 440 airports in the U.S. and an additional 1,615 guardsmen helped with border security they were kept in title 32 status in order to allow them to perform law enforcement functions and to allow the governor and/or Adjutant General (TAG) to retain command and control. The states were re-imbursed by the federal government to keep state funds from being drained. However the state status denies the National Guard member protection of the Federal Tort Claims Act and federal allowances and benefits. The PCA also denies the state governors the option and flexibility to request federal troops knowing that if the mission requirement is law enforcement then federal troops will not be able to perform this mission.

## PROTECTION OF MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS

Soon after September 11<sup>th</sup> approximately 11,000 Air Guardsmen were activated to support combat air patrol missions being flown over Washington DC, New York, and other major metropolitan areas. At this point the total numbers of personnel activated to perform missions within the U.S. far exceeded the 4,000 U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan. Prior to September 11<sup>th</sup> there were 8 Air Defense units protecting our U.S. territory, all manned by ANG personnel. After September 11<sup>th</sup> it made sense for the ANG to continue protecting U.S. territory. However, the number of Air Defense units increased and the flying hours drastically increased too. The Air Defense units were not equipped or manned to sustain the operational tempo they were tasked. The question arose, "Who should continue to perform this mission—the ANG or the active component? Who is manned and equipped to continue this mission? What should the ANG's role be?"

Three issues arise regarding the ANG's role in providing defense for major metropolitan areas: (1) the ANG's role and mission must be clearly defined; (2) decisions regarding the selection of operational assets must be made to meet mission requirements; and (3) support assets and infrastructure must be adjusted to ensure mission effectiveness.

This paper assumes that the ANG's role will be limited to providing air defense of high value, land-based assets or major metropolitan areas and that the ANG will provide protection from airborne threats. It also assumes, however, that ANG assets—including command, control and communication—will be integrated to work cooperatively with the civilian agencies charged with homeland defense.

Prior to September 11th, various ANG units located near the U.S. coastlines and borders were charged with the responsibility of providing homeland air defense.

They were made up of the F-16 and F-15 units that comprised the 1st and 9th Air Forces. They were known as the "ADF" or "Air Defense Forces". Included were such units as the 147th Fighter Wing (F-16C's from Ellington Field, Texas), and the 149th Fighter Wing (F-15's from Jacksonville, Florida). These ADF units ran 24-hour alert facilities, which housed two pilots and two crew chiefs, assigned to two ADF aircraft on 10-minute alert. Typically, the two aircraft were "cocked" for alert in special alert hangars—meaning the aircraft were pre-staged for immediate launch, with a full compliment of two-to-four Aim-120 and Aim-9M missiles, and 510 rounds of 20mm. The alert aircraft were under the direction and control of the numbered Air Force commander. The mission was governed

by a dedicated operational regulation, which set forth the specifics regarding command and control. Each ADF Guard unit had between 15 and 18 unit assigned aircraft, and of those, three were tasked with the alert mission.<sup>19</sup>

— Major John F. Easton

Immediately after September 11<sup>th</sup>, Air Force leadership assessed that the limited number of ADF assets was insufficient to provide defense for the perceived threat. Not only were the ADF units asked to increase their “ready alert” assets (to four, and in some cases six, alert aircraft), but non-ADF units, such as the F-16 general purpose units (e.g., the F-16 units from Syracuse, NY and Burlington, Vermont), were also assigned to support the homeland air defense mission. These units did not have the infrastructure and mechanisms in place to immediately handle 24-hour alert operations, although makeshift accommodations were made. Immediately after September 11<sup>th</sup>, funding became available to allow non-ADF units that were now tasked with homeland defense, to upgrade or construct facilities to handle 24-hour operations. For example, the Vermont F-16 unit purchased six mobile trailer homes, which were placed on the grounds outside the squadron, immediately adjacent to the flight line.

ANG fighter aircraft that are capable of employing in an air defense role, i.e., the F-16 and F-15, are high-speed, highly maneuverable interceptor aircraft.

Although they are capable of detecting small airborne targets at ranges beyond 20 miles, they are not very stable platforms for intercepting and “shadowing” slow-speed targets. Accordingly, an F-16 interceptor would have some difficulty flying slow enough to ascertain the intentions of a small crop duster aircraft that may be flying at 70-80 knots. On the other hand, the large commercial airline scenario is perfectly suited for the F-16/F-15. In the case of counter-drug operations, the ADF units often work in conjunction with other propeller-driven assets provided by other ANG units, or other federal agencies. This allows a seamless transition during the intercept of a slow-moving target, such that the F-16 can timely complete the intercept, identify and track the target, and then “hand it off” to the other assets that arrive later (due to slower top-end speeds).

In counter-drug operations, one goal was often to match slow-speed targets with slow-speed assets to avoid the difficulty of flying high-value assets, such as the F-16, at the edge of its performance envelope.<sup>20</sup>

— Major John F. Easton

Slower flying aircraft assets will have to be integrated into the Homeland Defense mission to compliment the ANG assets. It would be preferable, for purposes of training, chain-of-command, and continuity to have those assets assigned to the ANG units that are tasked with homeland defense. In other words, each such unit could be assigned a C-26A twin-propeller aircraft to compliment its assets dedicated to the homeland defense mission. Similar asset allocation now exists in some ADF units. For example, at Ellington Field, the 147<sup>th</sup> is assigned F-16s and one C-26A for counter-drug operations.

ANG units in reasonable proximity to major metropolitan areas should be tasked to provide 24-hour alert response from this date forward; with at least four aircraft on alert. This will require enhancement of support facilities including, in particular, quarters for pilots and crew chiefs, as well as aircraft shelters. It will also require greater funding beyond the readily calculable costs of "capital improvements", because many more Guard members will be on orders for missions in support of homeland defense.

In the final analysis, however, the role of any military aircraft providing homeland defense will be limited by the infinite number of possible threats such forces may face. In the air-to-air role, military aircraft are uniquely suited to defend against, or attack, other military targets. The next realistic threat to homeland security is nearly impossible to predict. It seems unlikely that it will resemble the type of attack experienced on September 11th, and therefore, the measure of success of the ANG mission will largely depend on its deterrent effect. It is, however, inconceivable that the United States would not now take active measures to implement a significant homeland air defense program. Preferably, the ANG's role in that program will be a small part in a much broader initiative, that includes targeted intelligence gathering, nationwide command and control, and integration with other forces and agencies, including a missile defense program designed to protect significant land-based targets.<sup>21</sup>

## **WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION-CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS**

Prior to September 11<sup>th</sup> DOD recognized the need to enhance the domestic capability to respond to terrorist incidents involving nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons.

In 1996 the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act mandated the U.S. enhance its capability to respond to WMD incidents and legislation designated DOD as the interagency lead.<sup>22</sup>

The name given to the DOD's initiative to improve capabilities to respond to WMD attacks was the "Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP)." Several initiatives have taken place since the program began and up to September 11<sup>th</sup>. The U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) led interagency training development and city visits. The interagency teams coordinate with first responders including emergency medical and hazardous material officials and tailored training to city requirements. Additionally the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) developed a terrorism annex to the Federal Response Plan (FRP) to ensure coordination across all agencies at all levels.

In FY 1997, DOD spent \$30.5 million on the training and civil response pieces of the program. In FY 1998, Congress appropriated \$43.2 million and in FY 1999 \$49.9 million for the program.<sup>23</sup> It is important to note that federal funding appropriated pursuant to the DPP can be used for training purposes only. There is no direct provision for acquiring WMD response equipment for state and local agencies. DOD can, however, loan equipment to state agencies for training purposes.

Not only did the federal government recognize the need to improve WMD response capabilities in 1998; they also recognized the importance of the NG as the first military responders on the scene. In FY 1999 the NG and the reserve component (RC) received \$49.2 million to begin addressing increased support requirements concerning terrorists use of WMD. The following are some of the efforts made by the NG in 1999:

- Development of 10 rapid assessment and initial detection teams (trained for prevention/consequence management of a WMD attack).
- Establishment of WMD patient decontamination teams.
- Training and equipping to conduct WMD search, survey, surveillance and sampling activities.
- Establishment of a consequence management program integration office under the Director of Military Support (DOMS) to oversee WMD response activities.
- Further incorporation of NG/RC into first responder training, long-term sustainment training and expanded use of distance learning capabilities.<sup>24</sup>

The goal of the DPP was to train 120 cities by FY 2001. The training courses included emergency responder operations, technician/hazardous materials, technician/emergency medical services, hospital provider, incident command, and a senior officials workshop. After the initial training was completed the DPP expected that city and state first responder training programs would incorporate the NBC training concepts into their own courses so that all new first responders would routinely be trained on WMD concepts. Little did anyone know, at that time, how important this program was to become.

Since September 11<sup>th</sup> the need to prepare for a possible terrorist attack, including the use of WMD on U.S. domestic soil has become more urgent. The DPP continues to move forward. However, in reaction to the current national security environment some changes are being made. The name of the rapid assessment and initial detection teams were changed to WMD-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST). They are comprised of 22 full-time National Guardsmen, army and air, and are considered to be the military's first line of defense against the emerging chemical or biological threat. Although the original plan was to field 10 teams, one per FEMA region, the NG Association of the U.S. (NGAUS) felt the terrorism threat required more teams. The association passed a resolution in September 1998 calling for at least one WMD-CST in each state and territory.<sup>25</sup>

Congress concurs with NGAUS' resolution and has since funded 22 more teams for a total of 32. 27 teams are now operational and have been active since September 11<sup>th</sup>. The teams do not self-deploy; they have to be requested. In February 2002 teams deployed to the Salt Lake City winter Olympics; the 2001 World Series at Edison Field, Anaheim, CA; and the post World Series parade.<sup>26</sup> The teams take random samplings in the areas of the event and check for chemical agents. All this is done in civilian clothes in order to not scare the population attending the event.

In addition to increased combat air patrol missions and use of WMD-CST's the ANG security forces personnel have been stretched thin. This is true not only in the ANG but also across the total Air Force. Lieutenant General Daniel James III, the Director of the ANG, stated in the November 2002 National Guard magazine that he has concerns about the over use of the security forces and says the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is looking into the situation. He states that he has tasked senior leaders and the security forces' major commands to come up with viable ways to relieve the stress.<sup>27</sup>

## PRESIDENT BUSH'S NATIONAL POLICIES AND GUIDANCE

Current U.S. policy on our nation's strategy for homeland security can be found in four documents. However, due to the infancy of organizations formed to lead the way in this area the documents are general and vague. The Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) dated September 30, 2001, National Security Strategy (NSS) dated September 17, 2002, National Military Strategy (NMS) dated September 30, 2002, and National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) dated July 2002 all contain clear objectives (ends) but lack specifics on courses of action (ways) and resources to support the policies (means).

The QDR outlines the objectives for defense of the U.S. as follows:

- Maintain sufficient military forces to protect U.S. domestic population, territory, and defense-related infrastructure against attacks from outside U.S. borders.
- Provide strategic deterrence and air and missile defense and uphold commitments under NORAD.
- Support U.S. civil authorities in managing natural and man-made disasters and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and environmental (CBRNE) related events in U.S. territories.
- Respond to acts of international terrorism committed on U.S. territory or the territory of an ally.<sup>28</sup>

All documents point out the need to incorporate all levels of government and civilian authorities. The NMS clarifies the military role in two distinct but interrelated areas-homeland defense and support to civilian authorities. Homeland defense is outlined as pro-active, externally focused, and conducted to counter a range of threats, most importantly those posed by WMD well as long range ballistic missiles. Simultaneously U.S. forces will engage in homeland defense and provide civil support to federal, state, and local authorities for domestic emergencies and law enforcement activities.<sup>29</sup> The NSHS discusses three circumstances under which the DOD would be involved in homeland security: 1) Combat Air Patrols (CAP) and maritime defense operations, 2) Emergencies, such as responding to an attack, accident, or natural disaster, and 3) Limited scope missions (where other agencies have the lead).<sup>30</sup> The NSS and the NSHS make some reference to the course of action the DOD and state

government will take. In addition to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security the DOD activated a new Unified Command, Northern Command (NORTHCOM), on 1 Oct 02. At the state level, the President is calling for each Governor to establish a single homeland security task force (HSTF) to serve as the primary coordinating body with the federal government.

## **HOMELAND SECURITY MANAGEMENT**

Since the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack on the U.S. Homeland, the issue of homeland security and the role of the military in support of homeland security is at the forefront. The national focus has centered on the importance of protecting our citizen's and other national interests within our own borders. President Bush responded to the threat of terrorism directed at U.S. interests by supporting the law establishing a Department of Homeland Security which was approved by congress on 24 November 2002. Of the many questions to be resolved is the question of the extent in which the military will participate in assistance to civil authorities; specifically in the event of a terrorist attack, man-made disasters, assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies, and other events.

A fundamental responsibility of government is to protect its citizens. Civilian agencies such as federal, state, and local governments have the primary responsibility of accomplishing this task. In the event of a domestic emergency the local responders arrive first on the scene. First responders typically include law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services, and hazardous materials teams. At the site of the disaster local authorities organize the first responders under the Incident Command System (ICS).<sup>31</sup>

The ICS provides unity of command with one commander who establishes an incident command post to direct operations. The incident commander is normally the senior responder. If the requirements exceed local capabilities, the incident commander can request additional support from state agencies. All states have a specific agency titled the state Office of Emergency Services (OES). The OES serves as the coordinating agency for the Governor in an emergency. The OES operates the state emergency operations center during a disaster or emergency and coordinates with federal agencies if required. The senior official in charge of the state OES varies by state. However, in some states the Adjutant General holds this position in addition to his duties as the senior military advisor to the Governor.<sup>32</sup> The Governor of the state, empowered by the U.S. constitution to execute the laws of the state, may choose to declare a "state of emergency" and activate the National Guard. He may also call upon other states for help through the use of interstate emergency assistance compacts. Finally the

Governor can request assistance from the federal government by requesting the President sign an emergency/major disaster declaration.

Once the President signs the declaration the state can receive assistance and the FRP is already under way. The FRP organizes emergency response into twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESF). The only ESF which designates the DOD as a primary agent is public works and engineering. The FRP outlines federal responsibilities (including DOD) and civil-military coordination requirements.

## **MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY**

The President and the Secretary of Defense establish priorities and determine what DOD resources will be made available to the state/local government. DOD resources are supplied only if the response and recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities. After the President signs the declaration of a federal disaster area and the National Guard's capabilities are extinguished the state Emergency Operating Center (EOC) will inform the regional FEMA and they will advise the President on the appropriate federal response. The DOD provides support through its executive agent (Secretary of the Army) and he, in turn, directs the Department of Military Support (DOMS) to dispatch an executive order designating the supported combatant commander (usually JFCOM and/or NORTHCOM). It is important to note that although command and control of the overall crisis response remains with the civilian designated as the incident commander, the military forces remain under military command and control.<sup>33</sup> Since the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland the military's participation in homeland security has become more valued. Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities (MACA) is a key component of homeland security. On 13 November 2002 the House of Representatives passed legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).<sup>34</sup> Headed by the former Governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Ridge, the new department will be organized to develop and coordinate a comprehensive national plan to strengthen protections against terrorists threats or attacks on the U.S.<sup>35</sup> The Department will consolidate 22 separate agencies into the new federal agency with 170,000 employees. Under the legislation proposed by Congress the new department will have one year to consolidate the agencies it will house. These agencies include the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Border Patrol, FEMA, and the Transportation Security Administration.<sup>36</sup>

Governor Ridge has stated the focus of the DHS will be to coordinate all federal government terrorist prevention and planning activities within the U.S.<sup>37</sup> The office will work with state and local governments on detection, preparedness, prevention, protection, response and recovery, and incident management.<sup>38</sup> The concept of protection for defense and consequence management is nothing new at the state or national level. Governors have been applying these concepts along with assistance from the DOD (MACA), FEMA, and other government agencies. The new concept of consolidating the “federal response” agencies under one umbrella is new and it is still to be seen how it will function.

In addition to the DHS, NORCOM contributes to homeland defense by organizing, training, and operating units within its area of responsibility. The new Combatant Commander, Air Force General Ralph E. Eberhart, will also have combatant command over the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ) in Norfolk, VA, including the Joint Task Force (JTF) Civil Support at Fort Monroe, VA, and JTF 6 at Fort Bliss, TX. The Deputy Commander position at NORCOM is filled by an active duty army officer, Lieutenant General Anderson.

## **NORTHERN COMMAND**

NORCOM will be responsible for coordinating all land and sea defenses of the U.S. The command is the lead DOD agency to coordinate support to other federal agencies, including the DHS, in the event of an attack. They will work with other agencies on military response if an attack is successful and provide military assistance to agencies such as FEMA.<sup>39</sup>

The formation of NORCOM marks the first time that a single military combatant commander has been placed in charge of homeland defense since George Washington took command of the new continental army on June 15, 1775.<sup>40</sup> NORCOM’s primary responsibility is to protect the continental U.S. and its contiguous waters, from the Aleutian Islands in the Pacific Ocean to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean, from external threats. It is also prepared, when directed by the President or SECDEF, to support lead federal agencies in the case that civil authorities along with the states’ National Guard cannot deal with a catastrophic domestic event.

Air Force Major General Dale Meyerrose, NORCOM’s director of architectures and integrations, recently emphasized the importance of improving the communications systems and procedures, which already exist within and between the National Guard and federal agencies. During the 13 November 2002 summit on Homeland Security Major General Meyerrose emphasized the need for NORCOM to tap into existing programs for

consequence management activities and develop the already existing lines of communications and interoperable systems within states into a more encompassing system, nation wide.<sup>41</sup>

With the establishment of NORCOM and the DHS it is evident that the MACA mission will change and most likely expand. Providing assistance to civil authorities through the use of National Guard troops or active component troops is nothing new for the DOD. The extent to which we provide troops will most likely change. The questions remain, "should it be the sole or primary mission" of the National Guard, the active component, or a combination of both? Also, how can the DOD best facilitate the expansion in military assistance to civil authorities? There is much discussion on the future role of the ANG and it's responsibilities to the defense of our homeland. NORAD, DOD, and the Department of Homeland Security have been given the task to determine what their role will be.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

First and foremost the Air National Guard should not be the sole military branch or even the lead for homeland defense. The original intention of a formulation of an Air National Guard was to provide "combat ready" forces to augment an independent Air Force. In addition the ANG would act as an instrument of internal security during peacetime. Putting the focus of homeland defense on the ANG would detract from its combat ready mission and result in a force which is unable to augment the active duty. This would significantly impact the combat ready status of our armed forces based on their current reliance on the ANG. In addition the ANG's federal status has always been second string to the active Air Force. Second class equipment funding and resources are a given which the ANG has dealt with for it's existence. If the National Guard takes full responsibility or even lead for homeland defense the funding should follow the same trend. At the present time there are about 168,083 guard and reserve troops on active duty fighting the war on terrorism. Since the military draw down in the 90's it is impossible to fight abroad without the NG and reserves.<sup>42</sup> Concurrently there would be problems if the active component took on the homeland defense missions. Posse comitatus issues would be a concern along with Governors losing control of access to their NG.

Although utilizing the ANG more in the Homeland Security effort appears to be the most logical answer there are problems associated with this option. Over the last decade the ANG's support to the AC has increased from 24 percent to 34 percent. Since September 11<sup>th</sup> it has increased even more. Asking our citizen soldiers to do more could cause retention problems. Currently the NG is utilizing the oldest equipment and airframes in the DOD. Overtasking these already overused resources for combat air patrols and homeland defense missions will

eventually lead to increases in safety mishaps and possible loss of life. In addition, increased activation of the ANG for state missions will drain state budgets and take funds away from other critical state programs. Although the NG has always had a dual mission to support the federal government and the state Governor it is not currently manned and equipped to increase its mission to include an increase in taskings to protect the nation against terrorist attacks.

The active Air Force component should take the lead on homeland defense with strong support from the Air National Guard. The AC has traditionally focused on prevention of attack to U.S. territory by deploying abroad. Shifting the focus to domestic protection, while at the same time projecting forces forward, will be a challenge. However, the AC has the budgetary process, resources, and command authority in place to assist Governors in performing missions related to homeland defense. We should utilize the National Guard's expertise as "combat ready" soldiers and citizens familiar with their local community and state infrastructure. In title 32 status the Guards' contribution should be to support state and local authorities, not to assume control. If the Governor calls upon the federal government for support the AC's contribution should be to provide the funding, resources, troops, and C2 with strong assistance from the National Guard.

NORTHCOM will play a significant role in the protection of the homeland. This is the first time a Combatant Commander has been put in charge of Homeland Defense. The NG has been assisting in Homeland Defense and domestic consequence management since 1636. A percentage of the senior leadership positions at NORTHCOM should be slotted for National Guard senior officers. Currently the Commander is an active duty four star general and the Deputy is an active duty three star general. At minimum the Deputy position should be a permanent slot for the National Guard. At the state level the Governor should appoint a General officer in charge of the states homeland security task force to coordinate with the federal government.

The structure and process which was in place before September 11<sup>th</sup> , the use of National Guard troops first, with the use of the AC if needed, is still the best option. However, the PCA will have to be addressed. Unless we significantly increase the number of national guardsmen there will continue to be situations where federal forces will have to be used to secure the safety of people in the U.S. The PCA needs to be repealed. Its usefulness has come to be outdated. The current national security environment requires this change. The act causes confusion among the American people and military commanders and forces the adoption of the many exceptions to the rule.

Finally, those activated to serve the homeland should receive appropriate benefits and adequate resources. Active defense in support of the homeland should be given the same weight and reverence as service overseas. Skirting around the PCA denies NG members protection of the Federal Tort Claims Act and other significant federal allowances and benefits. No matter the status, a Guard member should not be denied the same benefits their counterparts receive for deploying overseas.

The role of the military in support of the war on terrorism within the U.S. is currently unclear. There are many schools of thought on where responsibilities should lie, as witnessed by the turmoil associated with the formulation of the new DHS and NORCOM. The fact of the matter is that there is a good process already in place which only requires some adjustments to make it well suited for our current national security environment. The role of the military in assisting civil authorities is evolving. The establishment of the DHS and NORCOM will offer important lessons on how the process should change. The problem is we will not know if it works until it's tested.

## **CONCLUSION**

Although the capabilities and perception of the ANG has changed over the years the basic premise has not. ANG units have been activated for all major contingencies in the past 56 years however, the thought processes used by leaders has varied. Since September 11<sup>th</sup> the role of the ANG has taken on additional responsibilities with relation to homeland defense. These additional responsibilities were initially a response to an urgent need and time will tell if they will remain. Additional responsibilities for the Air National Guard include combat air patrol missions, law enforcement at airports and U.S. borders, and increased use of WMD-CST's. National policies with respect to homeland defense and the role of DOD is evolving. The standing up of the DHS and NORCOM demonstrates the drastic shift in national security priorities and also gives emphasis to the job of our Air National Guard assets. The proposed recommendations on the development of a homeland defense policy and, specifically, what the ANG's role should be will add focus to missions and responsibilities.

Defending the homeland is nothing new for the ANG. The challenge lies in the changing nature of warfare and subsequent change in how we employ our elements of national power. We cannot have a DHS or NORCOM without the ANG. We cannot provide for homeland defense without the ANG. There is no doubt the ANG today bears little resemblance to the early militiamen renowned for their ability to pick up a musket at a moment's notice and defend the homeland. But if you look closely at the ANG force today one will see the same volunteer

spirit, pride, and enthusiasm which emanated in the history of the ANG. It has been a flexible force, which has reacted to the changing national security environment and will continue to do so throughout its existence.

WORD COUNT: 6,547



## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002.

<sup>2</sup> The American College Dictionary. 1970, Random House, Inc. p.1096 and p.578.

<sup>3</sup> Pennsylvania State Adjutant General William Lynch, interview by author, 1 Oct 02 Carlisle, PA.

<sup>4</sup> Gross, Charles Joseph, Prelude to the Total Force: 1943-1969. 1985, p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>8</sup> The History of Air Guard Federal Call Ups.  
<http://www.ang.af.mil/history/callups.asp>. p.1-3.

<sup>9</sup> Noble Eagle/Enduring Freedom. <http://www.af.mil/news/efreedom/facts.shtml>. P.1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.,1.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Cohen, William S. and Shelton, Henry H., Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review, 14 Oct 99, [http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/b1014199\\_bt478-99.htm](http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/b1014199_bt478-99.htm).

<sup>14</sup> House Armed Forces Services Committee Statement by Brig Gen David A. Brubaker, P.2, March 13, 2002. <http://www.house.gov/hasc/pressreleases/2002/02-03-13brubaker.html>.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>18</sup> Major Craig T. Trebilcock, "The Myth of Posse Comitatus," Joint Center for Lessons Learned, Volume V, Issue 1 (September/December 2002): 15-18.

<sup>19</sup> Major John F. Easton (former F-16 pilot in the 147FW, TXANG), interview by author, 18 December, Carlisle, PA

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), "Domestic Preparedness: U.S. Responses need Tuning" Defense Link, 26 March 1998, p.5-6; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1998/s19980326-holmas.html>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2002.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p.7.

<sup>25</sup> Christopher Prawdzik, "CST-Protecting the Pastime," National Guard, November 2002, 25.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.24.

<sup>27</sup> "Newsbreaks: Air Guard Director Sees Evolution of Organization," National Guard, November 2002, 15.

<sup>28</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p.18.

<sup>29</sup> National Military Strategy, September 30, 2002, p.15.

<sup>30</sup> National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002, p.13.

<sup>31</sup> Department of Distance Education, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) (U.S. Army War College, 2002), 33.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 34-35.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 48-49.

<sup>34</sup> Mike Allen and John Mintz, "House Passes Homeland Security Bill," Washington Post, 14 November 2002, p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> "What is the Office of Homeland Security?" 25 November 2002; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/faq-homeland.html>; Internet; accessed 3 December 2002.

<sup>36</sup> Allen and Mintz, 1.

<sup>37</sup> Allen and Mintz.

<sup>38</sup> "What is the Office of Homeland Security?", 1.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 1.

<sup>40</sup> Haskell, Bob, "New Security Department Reinforces NORTHCOM Mission" Defense Link, 26 November 2002, p.2; available from <http://www.defenselink.mil.newsNov2002.html>; Internet; accessed 16 December 2002.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 3.

<sup>42</sup> Stephen J. Norton, "National Guard's Future: Home, Abroad or Both?" 7 October 2002; available from file: <C:/Temporary%20Internet%20Files/ OLKF52? National%20 Guard's% Future>; Internet; accessed 6 December 2002.



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